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International Criminal
Tribunals and Reconciliation
Reflections on the Role of Remorse and Apology
Oliver Diggelmann
Abstract
Literature on transitional justice routinely assumes positive effects of international
criminal proceedings on reconciliation processes. Expressions of remorse and apol-
ogy before international criminal tribunals are attributed a key role in the scen-
ario. This view is influenced by the role of remorse and apology in human dispute
resolution in general and, particularly, in domestic criminal proceedings. That
Western societies have become friendlier towards remorse and apology in the last
decades ç in the age of the ‘new culture of apology’ ç might also play a certain
role. This article argues, however, that there is a substantive gap between the
assumed and the actual role of apology and remorse in international criminal
proceedings. Analysis of the practice of international criminal tribunals reveals
that cases of sincere remorse or apologies among high ranks ç that would be of
particular value for reconciliation processes ç are hardly existent, and fakery of
remorse is fostered by judicial practice. Additionally, positive effects of remorse
and apology in the context of macro crimes tend to be overestimated. The article at-
tributes the gap between the assumed and the actual role partly to the wish to
avoid facing the void.
1. Introduction
When the United Nations (UN) Security Council created the ad hoc tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it acted on the basis of an assumption
that they would contribute to reconciliation in and between the concerned
societies. The resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) was explicit in this respect. According to its preamble, the tri-
bunal was meant to contribute, inter alia, to ‘national reconciliation’.1
 Professor of International Law, University of Zurich. My special thanks goes to my collaborator
De¤ sire¤ e Dittes for her thoughtful remarks. [oliver.diggelmann@rwi.uzh.ch]
1 SC Res. 955 (1994), Preamble.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016), 1 of 25 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqw055
 TheAuthor (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on D
ecem
ber 15, 2016
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The ICTR should promote moral catharsis and thereby pave the ground for the
reconstruction of the society. The resolution establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was adopted one
and a half years earlier, had been less clear. It only spoke of ‘restoration and
maintenance of peace’ and did not mention the term ‘reconciliation’.2 But, in a
resolution adopted in 1996, the UN General Assembly noted ‘the importance
and urgency’ of the tribunal’s work as an ‘element of the process of reconcili-
ation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region’.3 The interplay of trials
and media coverage, of statements by perpetrators, victims and members of
the civil society was expected to have a substantive healing effect. Remorse
and apology, which are not explicitly mentioned in any of the cited documents,
are implicitly attributed a key role in the scenario.Without them ç without a
certain reconnection between perpetrators and victims ç forgiveness and sus-
tainable reconciliation are hardly conceivable.4 Theoretical literature on transi-
tional justice arrangements, therefore, routinely assumes a substantive role of
remorse and apology in international criminal proceedings when it makes
links between trials and reconciliation.5 Many authors even tend to believe
that ‘[a] complete and sincere apology by itself is capable of effecting
reconciliation.’6
Two names are mainly associated with the topic of remorse/apology and
international criminal tribunals. Biljana Plavs› ic¤ , member of the collective presi-
dencies of both Bosnia and the breakaway Serbian Republic of Bosnia, made
a spectacular statement during her trial. It was praised as a paradigmatic
case of remorse and will be discussed later. Albert Speer, minister of
Armaments and War Production of Nazi Germany and Hitler’s main architect,
who was indicted at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, is
known for distancing himself from Hitler and the Nazi regime during the trial
and for accepting some responsibility. He was the only one to do so among
the main defendants at Nuremberg. A further name often associated with the
topic is Draz› en Erdemovic¤ . His case is known as a particularly ‘tragic’ one, be-
cause he found himself in a situation where he had to choose between shoot-
ing innocent civilians or being shot himself.7 In this article, my focus will
mainly lie on high-ranking perpetrators, though, as remorse and apology
2 SC Res. 827 (1993), Preamble.
3 GA Res. 51/203, 17 December 1996.
4 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M.Weinstein point out that the vocabulary of ‘remorse’ and ‘re-
conciliation’, which is borrowed from medical and theological models, artificially constricts
the frame of reference to examine phenomena that are still poorly understood: L.E. Fletcher
and H.M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to
Reconciliation’, 24 Human Rights Quarterly (2002) 573^639, at 600.
5 Michael Ignatieff early on critically examined the idea of a necessary link between trials and re-
conciliation, in The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (Henry Holt and
Company, 1997), at 184^190.
6 H.K. Josephs, ‘The Remedy of Apology in Comparative and International Law: Self-healing and
Reconciliation’, 18 Emory International Law Review (2004) 53^84, at 60.
7 On Erdemovic¤ ’s dilemma: I.R.Wall,‘Duress, International Criminal Law and Literature’, 4 Journal
of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2002) 724^744, at 725^728.
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from their side are expected to be of particular importance for reconciliation
processes. For the mentioned cases of Speer and Plavs› ic¤ , I will address the
question whether they are deservedly associated with the topic of remorse
and apology.
The principal aim of this article is to reflect on the role of remorse and apol-
ogy in international criminal proceedings in general. I will engage in the ques-
tion where the optimism with respect to their reconciliatory power in
international criminal proceedings stems from and whether they actually play
the role they are expected and assumed to. I will, eventually, argue that this is
less the case than in the domestic sphere. Three reasons will be identified.
First, international criminal tribunals often treat faked remorse as sincere.
Secondly, the likelihood of remorse and apology among high ranks ç where
it would matter most for reconciliation processes ç is low. Thirdly, the positive
effects even of sincere remorse and corresponding apologies after macro
crimes tend to be overestimated. The text inserts itself into critical reflections
about law and apology that have been under way for some years in domestic
legal systems, but have barely begun in the discipline of international law.8
After these introductory remarks (Section 1), I will first trace the origins of re-
morse as a mitigating factor in international criminal proceedings and con-
sider two arguments supporting an optimistic view (Section 2). Then, I will
turn to more critical reflections that challenge the optimism (Section 3).
Finally, I will suggest that our counterfactional hope in remorse and apology
is rooted in a spiritual need to make sense of our conceptions of humans and
humankind (Section 4).
2. Import of Domestic Practices
A. Granting a ‘Right to a Discount’
The topic needs to be addressed within a wide frame. The relatively short his-
tory of international criminal justice and its limited settledness must briefly
be recalled. If we regard the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as the forerun-
ners, the ‘modern’ history spans roughly over a quarter of a century. As impres-
sive as progress was after the end of the cold war, international criminal
proceedings in the aftermath of atrocities are still a relatively novel undertak-
ing. Expectations were high and experience was little in the 1990s when
international criminal justice was (re-)established. The architects and early
practitioners, most of whom were Westerners or Western-trained, mainly
availed themselves of domestic criminal law of liberal states. As a conse-
quence, structures, rules and methodologies heavily borrow from ‘ordinary’
criminal procedural law and systems of punishment of dominant
8 C. Jenkins, ‘Taking Apology Seriously’, in M. du Plessis and S. Pete¤ (eds), Repairing the Past:
International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights Violations (Intersentia, 2007)
53^81, at 65.
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Western states.9 This ‘import’ also concerned rules and practices with respect
to aggravating and mitigating factors. As regards the mitigating factor ‘re-
morse’, which I am particularly interested in, the ‘transfer’ was made without
paying attention to possibly significant particularities of remorse/apology in
the context of macro crimes.10 The question whether they can or should in
principle be treated the same way they are in the domestic sphere was not
posed. The relevant statutes in fact do not mention remorse.11 Nevertheless, it
found its way into international criminal proceedings through judiciary prac-
tice. Judges used the statutorial leeway to turn to the familiar and engaged in
comparative analysis of domestic criminal systems of dominant states.
Thereby they imported the tenet of remorse as a mitigating factor into the
international criminal system.12
Against this background, it becomes a key fact for our topic that inWestern
countries, remorse and apology are routinely taken into account in sentencing.
They are an essential part of everyday criminal law. Some randomly gathered
evidence may illustrate this. In the United Kingdom, for example, remorse is
always among the most frequently cited mitigating factors in criminal trials.13
In offences causing death, it is cited in no less than 39 per cent of the sentences
imposed,14 and in cases of domestic burglary, it is taken into account in 21
per cent of the cases.15 Remorse can make a substantial difference. In
Australia, it routinely leads to a substantial reduction of the normal sentence16
and US federal courts regularly reduce sentences by two or three ‘levels’ for de-
fendants who express contrition or remorse.17 It does not matter whether
grave crimes or minor ones are concerned, remorse is automatically treated
9 M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), at
23.
10 This omission of appropriate attention to macro crime specific challenges is also criticized with
respect to other aspects of international criminal law (see i.e. Drumbl, ibid., at 35^41).
11 Art. 24(2) ICTYSt., Art. 23(2) ICTRSt. and Art. 78(1) ICCSt. provide that the ‘circumstances of
the convicted person’ should be taken into account.
12 A. Tieger, ‘Remorse and Mitigation in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004) 777^786, at 784; see also the case
that introduced remorse as a mitigating factor into the practice of contemporary international
criminal tribunals: ICTY, Prosecutor’s Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, Erdemovic¤
(IT-96-22-T), 11 November 1996, at 6.
13 H. Maslen, ‘Penitence or Persistence: How Should Sentencing Factors Interact?’, in J.V. Roberts
(ed.), Exploring Sentencing Practice in England and Wales (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 173^193,
at 176.
14 Ibid.
15 Sentencing Council, ‘Crown Court Sentencing Survey’, Annual Publication 2014, 25 June 2015,
available online at www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/CCSS-Annual-2014.pdf
(visited 1 June 2016), at 29.
16 See R. Edney and M. Bagaric, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge
University Press, 2007), at 175.
17 St. Bibas and R.A. Bierschbach,‘Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure’,114
TheYale Law Journal (Yale LJ) (2004) 85^148, at 93 with further references.
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as relevant. Justice Anthony Kennedy said that expressions of remorse can
make the difference between life and death.18 Furthermore, remorse is also an
important factor when the perspectives of a defendant are assessed. Data
from the United Kingdom suggests that the likelihood of a perpetrator to be
sent to prison in burglary cases is reduced by 18 per cent when he is remorse-
ful.19 In sum, remorse seems to provide a ‘right to a discount’ that is routinely
granted.
The theoretical justification of this ‘right to a discount’ poses difficulties,
though. The issue is much less trivial than it might seem at first sight. A stand-
ard justification is that the remorseful perpetrator has a self-transformative
capacity.20 One can say that he is able to correct himself and, therefore, de-
serves a milder sentence. The argument is vulnerable to the criticism, however,
that there is no clear empirical evidence to support a correlation between re-
morse and decreased recidivism.21 The second justification is that remorse is a
moral good of its own and, therefore, worthy of civic recognition. Most people
would say that a remorseful person has a better character than a wrongdoer
who is not repentant.22 But is such a character really better? Does remorse
not show that the perpetrators would have had the emotional capacity to act
differently? As established as the ‘right to a discount’ may be in practice, the
theoretical justification is by no means watertight. To date, no empirical study
exists that has been able to settle the debate. If we additionally take into ac-
count that there might be relevant criminological particularities of remorse
and apology in the context of macro crimes, then the ‘unreflected’ import of do-
mestic practices into international criminal proceedings appears as an under-
taking on insecure ground. This notwithstanding the tenet of remorse was
adopted along with the hopes ç the conscious and the unconscious ones ç
connected to it. Before challenging the way the transfer was made, I will dis-
cuss two reasons for the optimism with respect to the adoption.
B. Hope to Exploit the Potential to Reconnect
We instinctively associate the topics of remorse and apology with reconciliation.
The link is deeply rooted in our socialization and everyday experiences. One of
the first childhood lessons about dispute resolution is importance of apologiz-
ing.23 Not learning it unavoidably leads to constant social problems and, eventu-
ally, not unlikely to isolation. Another early lesson concerns remorse.We learn
18 Riggins v. Nevada 504 U.S. 127, 144 (Justice Kennedy concurring).
19 Sentencing Council, supra note 15, at 29.
20 For the debate, see R. Zhong et al., ‘So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Criminal Law’, 42
The Journal of the Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (J Acad Psychiat L) (2014) 39^48, at 40.
21 Ibid., at 40.
22 J.G. Murphy, ‘Remorse, Apology, and Mercy’, 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2007)
423^449, at 438.
23 S.B. Goldberg, F.E.A. Sander and N.H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and
other Processes (3rd edn., Aspen Publishers, 1999), at 159^160.
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that remorse is expected when we have committed a wrong that cannot be re-
garded as harmless, when an ‘I am sorry’ is not enough and a visible emotional
reaction by the wrongdoer appears necessary. The phenomena apology and re-
morse need to be understood in some depth if we want to understand the con-
nections between international criminal justice and its role in reconciliation
processes ç and the gap between our expectations and reality. For reasons
that will become clear later, I will begin with some remarks on remorse.
Remorse is a moral emotion which is in principle familiar to everyone.
Laypeople and judges routinely refer to it when they judge other people, and
most of us think that they recognize it, when they see it.24 Theoretically, how-
ever, things are difficult. In psychological and psychiatric literature, remorse
is described as a poorly formulated concept, lacking clarity and uniformity in
both its definition and the definition of characteristics that show its presence
or absence.25 Tellingly, the most important standard manual for the classifica-
tion of mental disorders, the ‘DSM-5’, edited by the American Psychiatric
Association, only mentions ‘remorse’ once.26 Nevertheless, for the present pur-
pose, it seems clear enough, and we need it to understand the hopes put on
international criminal tribunals. Simplifying things somewhat, one can say
that remorse consists of a cognitive and an emotional component.27 A re-
morseful offender recognizes and explains, with the appropriate degree of spe-
cificity, what he has done. He says, for example, that while he committed the
crime on the victim, he regarded himself as more important and gave no
thought to the health of the violated person.28 The emotional component is
more complex. It can be described as the painful combination of feelings of
guilt and shame that arise in a person when he or she accepts responsibility
for seriously wronging someone else.29 There is a gravity threshold. Remorse
for minor wrongs is not possible.30 The crucial point is that the negative feel-
ings are so strong that they force the perpetrator to correct his self-image.
Remorse is more than feelings of guilt. It is primarily concerned with the
other, while the focus of feelings of guilt is on the self.31 Remorse typically
manifests itself through signs and bodily symptoms, rather than through
mere words.32 It is a form of internal punishment, imposed by one’s conscience
24 S.J. Morse, ‘Commentary: Reflections on Remorse’, 42 J Acad Psychiat L (2014) 49^55, at 55.
25 Zhong et al., supra note 20, at 39.
26 American Psychiatric Association (ed.), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(5th edn., American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013) 659^663. The capacity to experience re-
morse is mentioned as a criterion to assess whether someone suffers from an antisocial person-
ality disorder.
27 Morse, supra note 24, at 49.
28 Murphy, supra note 22, at 439.
29 J.G. Murphy,‘Well Excuse Me! Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentencing’, 38 Arizona State Law
Journal (2006) 371^386, at 377.
30 Murphy, supra note 22, at 430.
31 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, ‘Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa’,
42 Journal of Humanistic Psychology (2002) 7^32, at 21.
32 R.Weisman, Showing Remorse: Law and the Social Control of Emotion (Ashgate Publishers, 2014),
at 10.
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that has internalized the social community norms. Remorse has a spontaneous
character and cannot be planned.33 Recognized as faked, it embarrasses.
Sincere remorse, though, can have an amazing healing effect. Particularly
face-to-face expressions of remorse may matter immensely to victims.34
Research has shown that a substantial percentage of victims are highly inter-
ested in meeting with offenders.35 Seeing the offender himself suffer may
open up a road to reconnect. Remorse is painful, and as suffering from pain
cannot be evil, there is always some ‘good’ in meetings between remorseful of-
fenders and victims. The victim ‘visits’ the wounds of the perpetrator.
Symbolically, the moral balance is restored, at least partly. The message of the
crime ç that the community norms do not apply to the wrongdoer and that
he is superior to the victim ç is modified. The key element for reconciliation
is the attempt to appreciate the victim’s pain. If, say, Ratko Mladic¤ showed
symptoms of suffering severely because of what he did and were prepared to
endure face-to-face confrontations with victims, many would probably
assume that this would have a strong effect on the reconciliation process in
formerYugoslavia.
Apologies are to be distinguished from expressions of remorse. The two phe-
nomena are related, though. Generally speaking, an apology is a spoken act
that responds to a compelling social call about something that can neither be
forgotten nor forsaken.36 Erving Goffman ç a sociologist who analysed sym-
bolic aspects of human interaction ç defined apologetic behaviour as part of
the remedial work, which serves the function of repairing relationships after
injury.37 Form and content of an apology must be related to the gravity and
the circumstances of the wrong. For small wrongs, the formula ‘I apologize’
typically is adequate and sufficient. The apologizer confirms that he respects
the community norm and promises to continue doing so in the future. The
apology corroborates the community norm and has the function of keeping
the ‘wheels of civility’ oiled.38 In minor cases, the apology tells us nothing
about the mental state of the wrongdoer. The apology remains an entirely ex-
ternal and formal act.39 If I bump into someone and say ‘I apologize’, no further
steps are necessary, besides possibly a smile. The apology becomes more com-
plicated, when the wrong can no longer be regarded as harmless.40 The re-
quirements become higher and when the apology is perceived as inadequate
with respect to form, time or content, it turns into a provocation.41 A mere
33 Ibid., at 11.
34 Bibas and Bierschbach, supra note 17, at 116.
35 Ibid.
36 N. Tavuchis, Mea Culpa. A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford University Press,
1991), at 34.
37 E. Goffman, Relations in Public: Micro-Studies of the Public Order (Basic Books, 1971), at 109,
113^114; Jenkins, supra note 8, at 57.
38 Murphy, supra note 22, at 433.
39 Ibid., at 447.
40 Generally on the issues and traps of apology, see N. Smith, ‘Just Apologies: An Overview of the
Philosophical Issues’, 13 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal (2013) 35^65.
41 See for more details, A. Lazare, On Apology (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 77.
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‘I am sorry’ is perceived as inappropriate, for example, if someone has presented
himself as needy to his friends, while in fact being quite affluent, or if someone
has cheated on another person in a serious manner. The apology must contain
a ‘material’ connection to the wrong, and the appropriateness depends on a
number of circumstances: on the gravity of the wrong, the violated good, the
relationship between the involved persons etc.42 In some cases, reference to
the victim’s feelings may be necessary, in others a precise account of the facts
may be enough. In very grave cases, it may be necessary to make the moral
principle and the values at stake explicit. In such cases the line between appro-
priate and counter-productive apologies is thin. There are many traps. The of-
fender should, for example, not conflate several harms to one general and
unspecific harm, and he should identify the wrongs with the appropriate
degree of specificity and be aware that generalities easily provoke.43 Subtleties
matter. Awareness of them shows the victim that the offender no longer re-
gards himself as superior. Rape victims do not want to hear generalities on
rape as true as they may be. Their concern is the specific rape that was com-
mitted on them, their specific pain. Parents of war victims are not interested
in hearing what may happen when a civil war escalates. They want to know
about the circumstances that led to their immense loss. Formulating an appro-
priate apology for international crimes, accordingly, is a most delicate issue.
In some cases, giving a precise account of the facts and accepting responsibil-
ity may be sufficient. In others, remorse and repentance may be necessary. In
the latter cases, remorse and apology have an overlap.44 In sum, if circum-
stances are favourable, expressions of sincere remorse and adequate apologies
in principle have the potential to improve relations between perpetrators and
victims enormously ç and thus, to promote reconciliation. The likelihood of
this to happen in the context of macro crimes, however, will be discussed
later on.
C. Support by the ‘New Culture of Apology’
Western societies have become significantly friendlier towards remorse and
apology over the last decades.45 This development ç sometimes described as
the rise of the ‘new culture of apology’ ç seems likely to also have lowered
the threshold for apologizing and expressing remorse in international criminal
proceedings, at least to some extent. It is worth mentioning in this context
that traditionally, generally speaking, both remorse and apology were regarded
42 On the modes of apology, see Tavuchis, supra note 36, at 45^117.
43 N. Smith, ‘The Penitent and the Penitentiary: Questions Regarding Apologies in Criminal Law’,
2 Criminal Justice Ethics (2008) 82^85, at 82.
44 Murphy, supra note 22, at 447^448.
45 The term ‘age of apology’ is younger than the phenomenon and was coined by R.L. Brooks. See
R.L. Brooks, ‘The Age of Apology’, in idem, When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversies over
Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice (NewYork University Press, 1999) 3^12, at 3.
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mainly as signs of weakness.46 They were mostly treated as dishonourable and
regarded as incompatible with the formalities of public life. According to an
old Greek proverb, pointing out the essence of the traditional perception,
honour was lost when ‘I’m sorry’ was invented.47 As complex as the issue cer-
tainly is in the details, for our purpose it is important to note that politicians
traditionally did not apologize.
Things have changed remarkably in this respect. The ‘new culture of apol-
ogy’ has recoded apology and at the same time remorse, which are now seen
more as signs of strength, showing that one has the confidence to admit one’s
mistakes instead of denying them.48 Generally speaking, standards of private
ethics ç where apology was always indispensable, at least to some extent ç
have diffused into the public sphere. They have promoted a perception of
social relations in which an apology no longer has the ring of surrender. From
a cultural history perspective, the change can be interpreted as the mobiliza-
tion of a specific Christian heritage.49 In Christianity, humans are by definition
sinners, and sin and apology belong together.
The recoding of apology and remorse has opened up roads to easier recon-
ciliation. Humans are shown a way out of heroic stereotypes, of endless cycles
of accusation and counter-accusation, victims are no longer expected to
forget.50 Some Western societies have become particularly friendly towards
apologies, some are even said to be almost obsessed with them.51 Whether or
how far this primarily Western phenomenon has the power to transcend cul-
tures and facilitate public expressions of remorse in non-Western societies is a
question the complexity of which goes beyond the scope of this article. In prin-
ciple, though, we may carefully maintain that the rise of the ‘new culture of
apology’ seems to be good news for the case of international criminal tribunals
and reconciliation.
3. Critical Reflections
A. Fakery and Epistemic Limits of Tribunals
The problem of fakery and epistemic limits of tribunals is of particular import-
ance for our topic. My first critical reflection concerns the way remorse and
apology are dealt with in everyday practice of international criminal tribunals.
A critical analysis has to depart from the insight that deception is not an
46 This, of course, does not exclude that there were famous cases of remorse and apology. See e.g.
Sophokles, Antigone, 1271^1272 (Kreon wailing).
47 See N. Mills, ‘The New Culture of Apology’, 4 Dissent (2001) 113^116, at 115.
48 Ibid., at 113.
49 H. Lu« bbe, ‘‘Ich entschuldige mich’’. Das neue politische Bussritual (Siedler Verlag, 2001), at 23, 42.
50 Mills, supra note 47, at 116.
51 See T. Judt, ‘A Sorry State’,TheWashington Post, 9 May 2004; Lu« bbe, supra note 49, at 35, 38.
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exceptional human behaviour, but a common aspect of human interaction.52
Another key fact to be taken into account is that routinely granted discounts
for remorse create strong incentives to deceive. If the stakes are high, which is
by definition the case in the context of macro crimes, fakery is all but unlikely
to appear. The difficulty is that, generally speaking, tribunals can identify the
emotional component of remorse ç the described feelings of guilt and shame
ç only indirectly through circumstantial evidence or reliance on declarations
of the accused.53 The Plavs› ic¤ case, which was mentioned in the introduction,
is paradigmatic. It shows what can happen when the tribunal’s wish to see re-
morse becomes stronger than its commitment to investigate the truth. Biljana
Plavs› ic¤ , formerly professor of biology, was a leading Bosnian Serb political
figure from 1990 until the end of the war. In her capacity as Co-President of
the Serb leadership, she was involved in the persecutions of Bosnian Muslim,
Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations. On trial, she pleaded guilty
and released a statement supporting her plea in which she expressed her re-
morse.54 This was praised by the ICTY as an ‘unprecedented’ contribution to
the establishment of the truth and a ‘significant effort toward the advancement
of reconciliation’ ç and widely celebrated.55 After a while, though, after she
had received a mild judgment of 11years and spent some time in prison, she re-
tracted.56 She said in an interview that she had only pleaded guilty because
she had been unable to gather enough witnesses to testify on her behalf,
thereby not only recanting her guilty plea but also her statement of remorse.
Later she even explicitly stated she still felt she had done nothing wrong.57
And yet it was precisely her guilty plea that had prompted the court to drop
the charge of genocide against her.58 Many victims, but not the judges, had al-
ready recognized the fakery at the moment Mrs Plavs› ic¤ made the statement.59
The tribunal, though, not only rewarded it by considering it a mitigating
factor, but in addition interpreted her plea of guilty as an additional sign of
remorse.60
52 L. ten Brinke, S. Macdonald and B. O’Connor,‘CrocodileTears: Facial,Verbal, and Body Language
Behaviours Associated with Genuine and Fabricated Remorse’, 36 Law and Human Behavior
(2012) 51^59, at 51.
53 Tieger, supra note 12, at 778.
54 ICTY Press Release, ‘Statement on Behalf of Biljana Plavs› ic¤ / Statement by Robert Pavich, Lead
Counsel for Biljana Plavs› ic¤ ’ (PIS/697e), 2 October 2002, available online at http://www.icty.
org/en/press/statement-behalf-biljana-plavsic-statement-robert-pavich-lead-counsel-biljana-
plavsic (visited 1 June 2016).
55 Sentencing Judgment, Plavs› ic¤ (IT-00-39&40/1-S),Trial Chamber, 27 February 2003, x67.
56 J. Subotic¤ , ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavs› ic¤ at the Hague’, 36 Southeastern Europe
(2012) 39^51, at 48.
57 Interview in English with the Swedish newspaperVi Magazine, January 2009, available online
at http://www.thelocal.se/17162/20090126 (visited 1 June 2016).
58 Plavs› ic¤ (IT-00-39 & 40-PT), Plea Agreement, 30 September 2002, x3, available online at http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4/en/020930plea_en.pdf.
59 Subotic¤ , supra note 56, at 46.
60 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 55, x73.
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Distinguishing sincere remorse from faked, for sure, is a demanding task.
Courts are not in a particularly good position to fulfil it as judges only see bits
and pieces of the defendant, and this in a highly formalized environment. The
likelihood of deception is substantial. A study by the Yale School of Medicine
Department of Psychology provides important insights into the problems
judges face when they are confronted with questions concerning remorse.
They often disagree widely with regard to relevant indicators.61 Some regard si-
lence, for example, as a clear indication of remorselessness. Others treat it as
a sign of shyness, fear or poor public speaking skills. In principle, though, it
can also result from a conscious decision to not even try to show remorse be-
cause the evidence available to the prosecution is so damaging to any claim of
remorse that an attempt to express it would only invite a devastating rejec-
tion.62 Similar ambiguities exist with respect to putting one’s head down or
making eye contact. For some judges, putting one’s head down is a sign of re-
spect, while others see it as an indication of remorselessness.63 Eye contact
can result from the willingness to face the truth, but also be part of an attempt
to be a particularly convincing liar.64 The epistemic problem is further compli-
cated, of course, if the allegedly remorseful perpetrator suffers from a psychi-
atric illness.65 Interestingly, however, research nevertheless has found some
relatively reliable clues. Falsified descriptions of remorseful feelings, for ex-
ample, are generally accompanied by a greater range of emotions than genuine
ones.66 People who fake remorse, often leak positive feelings such as happiness
or relief through the lower face. The more emotions are shown, the higher the
likelihood that remorse is faked. A quite reliable clue also seems to be whether
someone displays feelings of anger.67 Anger and regret seem to exclude each
other. A further indicator is the speed of transitions between positive and
negative emotions. Genuinely remorseful persons rarely display immediate
transitions between positive and negative emotions; there is almost always a
return to a neutral ‘baseline’.68 Notwithstanding these clues, the difficulty of
recognizing sincere remorse in practice can hardly be overestimated.
How do international criminal tribunals master the task? I shall answer the
question by examining the practice of the ad hoc tribunals.69 Both the ICTY
and the ICTR have the legal leeway to take remorse into account in their sen-
tencing70 and have decided a high number of cases so that statistical figures
61 Zhong et al., supra note 20, at 43.
62 Weisman, supra note 32, at 62.
63 Zhong et al., supra note 20, at 43.
64 ten Brinke, Macdonald and O’Connor, supra note 52, at 53.
65 Zhong et al., supra note 20, at 39.
66 ten Brinke, Macdonald and O’Connor, supra note 52, at 57.
67 Ibid., at 57.
68 Ibid.
69 To date, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has only had to deal with remorse in one case at
the trial stage and in two cases at early release proceedings. A meaningful analysis of its prac-
tice is, therefore, not yet possible.
70 Art. 24(2) ICTYSt. and Art. 23(2) ICTRSt. provide that the ‘circumstances of the convicted
person’ should be taken into account.
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are significant. The ICTY, to begin with, states in its steady case law that ex-
pressions of remorse can be treated as a mitigating factor if they are ‘real’ and
‘sincere’.71 By setting such a standard, it commissions itself with a thorough as-
sessment of whether these criteria are met. The reality looks different. The tri-
bunal is extremely generous in accepting statements of remorse as sincere,
particularly when a guilty plea is entered at the same time. No less than 31
out of 81 persons convicted until 20 June 2016 made statements of remorse.72
The court only deemed four of these not sincere.73 A serious examination and
justification of the denial can be found in exactly one judgment, the one con-
cerning Esad Landz› o.74 The most extreme example of the court’s more than
generous practice is the case of Dragoljub Kunarac. In this instance, the ICTY
almost emptied remorse of any substantive requirements. Kunarac was a
leader of a unit of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and charged with crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war in form of tor-
ture, rape and enslavement. He neither pleaded guilty to all charges nor did
he explicitly express any remorse during the trial. The court, however, inter-
preted his statement that he felt guilty about the fact that a woman was gang
raped, while he was raping another person in an adjoining room, as a state-
ment of remorse, and considered it a mitigating factor.75
The key problem is that the ICTY has developed a practice of gratifying
guilty pleas by too easily recognizing them as a sign of sincere remorse. The
threshold for accepting remorse as sincere especially in combination with a
guilty plea has been lowered to a degree that one can hardly say that it still
corresponds with the psychological concept of remorse. This does not mean
that the court does not distinguish between guilty pleas and remorse at all. It
does so, but in a rather remarkable way. The ICTYdeems it possible for a perpet-
rator to repent without admitting to a crime, arguing that remorse can mean
accepting some measure of moral blameworthiness for personal wrongdoing
without accepting criminal responsibility or guilt for the whole indicted
crime.76 The tribunal has indeed judged accordingly with respect to six indi-
viduals.77 The distinction can only be explained, in my view, by the wish of
the ICTY to avoid a high threshold for remorse in order to keep it an effective
incentive for cooperation. The consequence of this practice is that the court
does not engage in a serious enough assessment of the sincerity of the remorse.
Analysis shows that every time a defendant expressed remorse and also
71 See e.g. Judgment, Mrks› ic¤ et al. (IT-95-13/1-T),Trial Chamber II, 27 September 2007, x700 (with
further references).
72 For the number of sentences, see the infographic ‘Facts and Figures’, available online at www.
icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures (visited 1 June 2016).
73 The number of individuals whose expressions of remorse were accepted as sincere or rejected
was established by my research team.
74 Judgment, Mucic¤ et al. (IT-96-21-T),Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, x1279.
75 Judgment, Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T),Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, x869.
76 See Judgment, Strugar (IT-01-42-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 July 2008, x365.
77 The six judgments are: Kunarac et al. (Kunarac) (IT-96-23 & 23/1); Simic¤ et al. (Tadic¤ and Zaric¤ )
(IT-95-9); Blas› kic¤ (IT-95-14); ICTY, Brd~anin (IT-99-36); Strugar (IT-01-42).
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pleaded guilty, the remorse was qualified as sincere. The four times sincerity
was denied there was no concurrent plea of guilty.78 In the Plavs› ic¤ case, the
ICTY laconically stated that by pleading guilty the defendant had already dis-
played remorse.79 This practice of directly inferring sincerity of remorse from
pleas of guilty benefits both the tribunal and the perpetrators, but not the vic-
tims. The tribunal is tempted to reward guilty pleas by treating them as sincere
remorse, as this may allow it to get to the heart of the crime more quickly
which increases the efficiency of the trials. More convictions become possible.
Perpetrators get the ‘discount’ of sincere remorse in return for accepting some
guilt which typically is a good deal for them. A serious assessment of remorse
only takes place exceptionally. This can be seen as a capitulation to the epi-
stemic and the efficiency problem. It deserves mention that in the early phase
of the ICTY, guilty pleas did not play a role.When more and more defendants
came into the tribunal’s custody, though, things started to change. The ICTY
became aware of how lengthy, costly and complicated international criminal
proceedings are.80 Both prosecutors and judges realized that full-scale pro-
ceedings on the expanded docket were extremely time-consuming. Given the
temporal limits imposed on the forum’s activity,81 efficiency considerations
took over the steering wheel.
At the ICTR, the picture looks similar. The tribunal also employs the main
ICTY criterion of ‘sincere remorse’82 and practices ‘guilty plea gratification
deals’ as described. Nine of 61 individuals convicted until 20 June 2016 ex-
pressed remorse.83 Only in one instance, it was not accepted as a mitigating
factor.84 This was the only conviction of an allegedly remorseful person in
which no plea of guilty existed. The court did not assess the sincerity of the re-
morse, though, but sweepingly denied that an expression of remorse existed
at all. It follows that the ICTR, to date, has not in one single case rejected an ex-
pression of remorse due to its lack of sincerity. Generally, the number of al-
legedly remorseful individuals at the ICTR is lower in comparison with the
ICTY, but the ratio of accepted remorse is higher. In sum, one could say that
78 The four judgments are: Mucic¤ et al. (Landz› o) (IT-96-21); Vasiljevic¤ (IT-98-32); Lukic¤ (Milan) &
Lukic¤ (Sredoje) (Lukic¤ , Sredoje) (IT-98-32/1); Mrks› ic¤ et al. (Mrks› ic¤) (IT-95-13/1).
79 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 55, x73.
80 M.R. Damas› ka, ‘Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts’, 2 JICJ (2004) 1018^1039, at
1035. For thoughtful remarks by Antonio Cassese on the problem, see H.V. Stuart and M.
Simons, The Prosecutor and the Judge. Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese. Interviews and
Writings (Pallas Publications, 2009), at 86^89.
81 Damas› ka, supra note 80, at 1035.
82 See e.g. Judgment and Sentence, Serugendo (ICTR-2005-84-I), Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2006,
x 63 (with further references).
83 For the number of sentences, see the ‘The ICTR in brief’, available online at http://www.unictr.
org/en/tribunal (visited1 June 2016). The number of individuals who expressed remorse was es-
tablished by my research team.
84 Judgment and Sentence, Nchamihigo (ICTR-01-63-T), Trial Chamber III, 12 November 2008,
x 392. The number of individuals whose expressions of remorse were accepted as sincere or re-
jected was established by my research team.
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the Trial and Appeals Chambers of both the ICTYand the ICTR have developed
a practice that essentially avoids critical assessment of remorse.
This picture is confirmed by an analysis of early release practice. I looked at
the cases at the ICTY, the ICTR and the UN Mechanism for International
Criminal Tribunals (MICT).85 Again, efficiency prevails over the commitment to
investigate the truth, generally speaking. The rules of procedure and evidence
of the mentioned tribunals list four factors to be taken into account when deci-
sions on early release are made: the gravity of the crimes, the treatment of simi-
larly situated prisoners, the prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation and any
substantial cooperation with the prosecutor.86 Remorse, in principle, is an
aspect of the ‘rehabilitation’criterion. In practice, though, the ‘treatment of simi-
larly situated prisoners’ criterion has been applied in a way that it developed
into a de facto presumption of unconditional early release after prisoners have
served two-thirds of their sentences, thereby practically overruling the other cri-
teria.87 There is not one ICTY, ICTR or MICT case to be found, in which an appli-
cant had served two-thirds of his sentence and early release was denied due to
lack of remorse. The Plavs› ic¤ case needs to be cited again. It shows an ICTY that
acted wilfully deaf. Plavs› ic¤ ’s early release hearing took place after she had pub-
licly recanted her remorse statement and guilty plea. The President of the ICTY,
however, did not even touch upon her recantation and undeviatingly continued
to regard her guilty plea to constitute remorse.88
The described practices concerning guilty pleas and early release reveal a
remarkable gap between the tribunals’ daily work and the initially mentioned
‘background purpose’ ç to contribute to reconciliation. The tribunals have
created incentives to fake remorse and make strategic apologies.
Reconciliation, though, is a child of sincerity and authenticity. It needs forgive-
ness,89 and forgiveness and sincerity are close allies, even if sincerity of a per-
petrator may be only a first step towards reconciliation.90 Empirical research
has found that victims of human rights abuses are indeed more forgiving
when they believe a wrongdoer is truly sorry.91 International criminal
85 The MICT has taken over all enforcement matters (including early release) from the ICTR (since
July 2012) and the ICTY (since July 2013); see SC Res. 1966 (2010), Annex 1 Art. 1 and Annex
2 Art. 6; see also supra note 69.
86 Rule 125 ICTY RPE, Rule 126 ICTR RPE and Rule 151MICT RPE.
87 J.H. Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’, 123 Yale LJ (2014) 1784^1828, at 1788,
1795^1796.
88 Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs
Biljana Plavs› ic¤ , Plavs› ic¤ (IT-00-39 & 40/l-ES), 14 September 2009, x8.
89 W.J. Long and P. Brecke, War and Reconciliation (MIT Press, 2003), at 65; S. Freedman,
‘Counseling, Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Importance of Understanding How They
Differ’, 4 Counseling andValues (1998) 200^216, at 203^205 with further references.
90 G.J. Gold and B.Weiner, ‘Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies’, 22 Basic and
Applied Social Psychology (2000) 291^300, at 291; L. Taft, ‘Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology’, 109 Yale LJ (2000) 1135^1160, at 1138.
91 A. Allan et al., ‘Research Report: Exploration of the Association Between Apology and
Forgiveness Amongst Victims of Human Rights Violations’, 24 Behavioral Sciences and the Law
(2006) 87^102, at 96.
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tribunals, however, that display disinterest in the authenticity and sincerity of
remorse and reduce them to mere speech acts with a bargaining value, con-
tribute to gambling away the ground for reconciliation. In the eyes of victims,
granting ‘discounts’ for recognizably faked remorse and strategic apologies is
cynic. Are international criminal tribunals aware enough of how closely their
legitimacy is linked to their commitment to the truth?
B. High-Ranking Defendants
For the process of reconciliation, remorseful or apologizing political or military
leaders would be particularly valuable. Public signs of remorse or a sincere ‘I
am sorry’ of those who bear the main responsibility have a high symbolic
value. In the imaginative universe, the collectivity of the perpetrators sends a
sign to the collectivity of the victims that it is starting to face the truth about
the crimes, the victims and themselves. The likelihood for this to happen in
reality, however, is very low. At the Nuremberg Trials, of the 23 main defend-
ants, only one, Albert Speer, accepted some guilt.92 He did not express remorse
properly, though, but only recognized his responsibility in very general
terms.93 Most defendants showed indignation and anger about being indicted,
none of them seemed to suffer because of what they had done. At the ICTY,
the situation is no different. Of the best known leading figures ç Slobodan
Milos› evic¤ , Radovan Karadz› ic¤ and Ratko Mladic¤ ç until the present day only
Karadz› ic¤ has shown ç highly questionable ç signs of slight remorse that
will be discussed later on. No member of the top circle, though, has made an at-
tempt to apologize. Milos› evic¤ was ç and Mladic¤ still seems ç untouched by
what happened to the victims of the other conflict parties. Both were furious
about being indicted and constantly accused or still accuse the tribunal.
Milos› evic¤ , who died during his trial, consistently pursued a strategy of blaming
the tribunal as the aggressor, and presenting himself and the Serbian people
as the victims.
Analysis of ICTY jurisprudence shows that sincere expressions of remorse
among high ranks are very rare. Of 81 individuals convicted until 20 June
2016, four high-ranking figures made remorseful statements that were ac-
cepted as a mitigating factor. Two of them, Radovan Karadz› ic¤ and Biljana
Plavs› ic¤ , were members of the top circle. The fakery of Plavs› ic¤ ’s remorse has
been discussed. In Radovan Karadz› ic¤ ’s case ç to be looked at in the next
92 Martin Bormann was included into the indictment, although he was absent and, as became
known much later, already dead when the proceedings began. He is not counted here.
93 With some historical distance it has become clear how refined Speer’s strategy at Nuremberg
was where he appeared as the humble and reflective Nazi. He expressed repentance over dicta-
torship, but also said that he had planned a gas attack on Hitler, which was a blunt exagger-
ation of probably no more than a vague thought. Speer mainly spoke of the German people
and did not refer to what the crimes meant for the victims. He condemned Hitler and his dicta-
torship, and warned the world of the dangers of future wars. There was neither an ‘I am
sorry’ nor any precise account of his involvement in the crimes. Speer called his own fate unim-
portant in comparison to the events in general and the tasks to master in the future.
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paragraph ç the sincerity of his remorse does not withstand close examin-
ation. There is probably only one case of an unambiguously remorseful high-
ranking perpetrator, the case of Milan Babic¤ . It shows how shattering sincere
remorse can be when a perpetrator of macro crimes fully realizes what he has
been part of.94 Babic¤ was the President of the government of the self-declared
Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) Krajina between August 1991 and
February 1992, and afterwards of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) in
north-eastern Croatia. He promoted a campaign of persecution against non-
Serbs, fomenting an uprising which enabled the Serb-dominated Yugoslav
army to attack Croatia and later Bosnia. He did not belong to the highest
circle of political and military leaders, but he was fully aware that his behav-
iour would lead to crimes such as mistreatment in prisons, deportations or for-
cible transfer. From the beginning of the trial, he accepted responsibility and
pleaded guilty to all charges. The court regarded his statements as sincere
and sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment.95 In 2006, Milan Babic¤ com-
mitted suicide in his prison cell.
The most high-ranking perpetrator ever to be convicted by the ICTY,
Radovan Karadz› ic¤ , is of special interest for our purpose. His case illustrates
how receiving a ‘discount’ for a statement of remorse has become the routine
reward for the use of exactly tailored phrases. Karadz› ic¤ was a founding
member and President of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) until his resigna-
tion on 19 July 1996. He belonged to the three-member Presidency of
Republika Srpska and thereafter sole President and supreme commander of its
armed forces. The ICTY found Karadz› ic¤ guilty of genocide in relation to the
massacre in Srebrenica, where more than 7000 Bosnian men and boys were
killed. It also found him responsible for crimes against humanity and war
crimes including torture, rape and killing in detention of thousands, perpe-
trated with the intent to systematically remove the Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat populations from territories claimed by Bosnian Serbs. His role
in the siege of Sarajevo was deemed so instrumental that without his support
it would not have occurred. Karadz› ic¤ was sentenced to 40 years of imprison-
ment. A plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf. In a few instances,
though, he expressed regret to a witness for the crimes the witness had suf-
fered.96 In his final brief, Karadz› ic¤ stated: ‘President Karadz› ic¤ expresses his
deep regret and sympathy to the victims of the crimes ::: and to their families.
Regardless of the issue of his individual criminal responsibility for those crimes
(emphasis added) he understands that as President of Republika Srpska, he
94 The fourth high-ranking perpetrator whose expressions of remorse were accepted as sincere
was Dragan Obrenovic¤ . Like Babic¤ he was not a member of the top circle, but Obrenovic¤ was
chief of staff and acting commander of a brigade of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). He was
charged with crimes against humanity in the form of persecutions on political, racial and reli-
gious grounds. Originally unrepentant, he made a statement of remorse during his trial that
was considered as sincere. Sentencing Judgment, Obrenovic¤ (IT-02-60/2-S), Trial Chamber I,
Section A, 10 December 2003, x120.
95 Sentencing Judgment, Babic¤ (IT-03-72-S),Trial Chamber I, 29 June 2004, xx 81^84, 102.
96 Judgment, Karadz› ic¤ (IT-95-5/18-T),Trial Chamber, 24 March 2016, x6059.
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bears moral responsibility for any crimes committed by citizens and forces of
Republika Srpska. He knows that any expression of regret or sympathy is inad-
equate to compensate for the suffering that took place during the war.
Nevertheless, he offers his heartfelt expression of regret and sympathy ::: ’.97
The ICTY first stated that sympathy for the victims does not amount to remorse
as such ^ but nonetheless considered it as a mitigating factor.98 It held that it
had given due consideration to the expressions of regret in determining the ap-
propriate sentence to be imposed.99 An explicit assessment of the sincerity of
Karadz› ic¤ ’s remorse was not undertaken, and there is also no explicit statement
declaring his statement a mitigating factor resulting in a reduction of his sen-
tence; but that is exactly what the overall picture looks like. It is telling that
Karadz› ic¤ ’s final statement exactly mirrors the wording of the ICTY’s case law
concerning the possibility to express remorse without admitting criminal re-
sponsibility at the same time.100 The statement sounds entirely calculated, es-
pecially when one considers that during his defence closing statement he also
said: ‘I really was a true friend to the Muslims. I know of no one in the Serb
leadership who wanted to harm Muslims or Croats.’101 Given the bluntness of
the lie, it is simply impossible that Karadz› ic¤ ’s statement of regret was more
than a purely strategic move. Nevertheless, the court apparently gratified it.
The picture at the ICTR looks even worse. Of 61 individuals convicted until
20 June 2016, not one high-ranking defendant ever expressed sincere remorse.
Defendants at the ICTR typically acknowledge that atrocities took place, but
they consider them as excesses of legitimate and spontaneous defence efforts
on behalf of the conflict party to which they belonged.102 The case of Jean
Kambanda is paradigmatic. Kambanda was the Prime Minister of Rwanda’s in-
terim government, following the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana,
and the highest ranking former political leader in the ICTR’s custody. He was
accused and found guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide and further crimes. Kambanda had
publically encouraged killing, incited massacres, and congratulated people for
having committed murders. On advice of his counsel Kambanda pleaded
guilty ç the first time ever that a head of state pleaded guilty to genocide. He
appeared completely unrepentant, though, and did not express any remorse.
When asked during his sentencing hearing, if he had anything to say, he
stated that he had nothing further to add.103 On request of the prosecution
and the defence, the ICTR nonetheless discussed whether Kambanda’s guilty
plea was a sign of remorse. It eventually declined to interpret it in such a
97 Ibid., x6059.
98 Ibid., x6060.
99 Ibid.
100 See Judgment, supra note 76, xx 365^366.
101 Defence Closing Statement, Karadz› ic¤ (IT-95-5/18), Trial Chamber, 1 October 2014, at
47852, x19.
102 N. Amoury Combs, ‘Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of
Sentencing Discounts’, 69 Vanderbilt Law Review (2006) 69^151, at 118.
103 See ibid., at 108.
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manner, though, and stated that it was mindful that remorse is not the only
reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea,104 and Kambanda
was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, however, Kambanda chal-
lenged the validity of his guilty plea and argued that he had not been correctly
informed by the ICTR that he would probably still receive a life sentence even
if he pleaded guilty. The verdict was upheld. Kambanda’s failure to show re-
morse and the resulting consequences he faced was a lesson to all who fol-
lowed him.105 All subsequent guilty-plea defendants expressed their remorse
very carefully. Paul Bisengimana, for example, former bourgmestre of a com-
mune near the capital Kigali, was initially indicted for, inter alia, genocide, ex-
termination and rape as crimes against humanity. He only pleaded guilty to
the charges of having aided and abetted in the commission of the crimes of
murder and extermination, though. His expression of remorse was very care-
fully scripted. He only acknowledged the omissions that he had pleaded guilty
to. At the pre-sentencing hearing, Bisengimana asked for pardon from the
families that lost people in his commune and publicly expressed remorse, but
only for not having been able to save those innocent people, which would
have been his first duty.106 The court accepted his remorse as a mitigating
factor even though it obviously was not remorse in the proper sense.
Bisengimana was convicted of extermination as a crime against humanity
and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment.
The few completed cases at the ICC do not alter the picture either. The only
case addressing the issue of remorse of a high-ranking defendant is the one of
Germain Katanga, a former leader of a Congolese rebel unit. During his trial,
Katanga made a statement that was obviously just paying lip service. He just
said that he felt compassion for the victims, and he described his feelings spe-
cifically with respect to the victims from his own community.107 The ICC did
not accept remorse as a mitigating factor in this case.108 There are, in sum,
just very rare cases of sincere remorse of high-ranking or even leading figures
in the practice of international criminal tribunals.
Why? Given the gravity of the crimes and the social intelligence needed to
climb up social hierarchies, even if they are pathological, one might rather
expect the opposite, at least at first sight. The question is hardly touched upon
in literature. The human inclination to label such perpetrators as ‘butchers’,
‘monsters’ or ‘animals’ ^ to create distance to them by way of dehumanization
^ is not helpful either. I will tackle the complex question in three steps.
The first step is ç I follow the Bulgarian historian Tzvetan Todorov ç to
suggest to stop using the word ‘human’ as a compliment.109 In the positive as
in the negative, as a matter of fact, humans are capable of the most extreme.
It is humans that are capable of committing macro crimes without
104 Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR 97-23-S), 4 September 1998, x52.
105 Amoury Combs, supra note 102, at 208.
106 Judgment, Bisengimana (ICTR-00-60-T),Trial Chamber II, 13 April 2006, x137.
107 Decision on Sentence, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3484),Trial Chamber II, 23 May 2014, x118.
108 Ibid., x121.
109 See T. Todorov, ‘Memory as Remedy for Evil’, 7 JICJ (2009) 447^462, at 453.
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experiencing remorse,110 and it is humans that find reasons for massacres they
commit on members of the same species ^ not animals, so the comparison
with animals is misleading anyway.111 The problem must lie in some aspects
of our common anthropological condition. Too many persons are involved in
macro crimes that one could categorically call perpetrators mentally ill or sad-
istic. The overwhelming majority of the perpetrators seems to share our hu-
manity and is induced to engage in the crimes by particular social, historical
or psychological circumstances.112 It deserves mention that the former pros-
ecutor of the ICTY, Richard Goldstone, once estimated that about 200,000
people had committed crimes in the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia, but statistically
only a small minority could have been mentally ill or sadistic.113 In principle,
most perpetrators were, therefore, average humans, as difficult as it may be to
say so.114 Macro crimes, generally speaking, mainly result from behaviour and
reactions familiar to everyone that ç under certain circumstances ç have
disastrous consequences.115 All humans, as Antonio Cassese and many others
say, share the traits of a certain aggressivity and destructiveness,116 but most
people manage to repress such impulses or to channel them towards peaceful
and constructive action. Only in some cases, repression and channelling fails
with terrible consequences. Adolf Eichmann, the organizational mastermind
of the extermination of the Jews, is a dramatic example.117 Hannah Arendt’s de-
scription of Eichmann as a thoughtless bureaucrat is probably not appropriate
ç Bettina Stangneth has shown that his strong craving for personal recogni-
tion was his main driving force118 ç but Arendt’s insight that average human
characteristics play a key role remains valid. Eichmann pursued personal
goals many people share ç career advancement and personal recognition ç
with an attitude most people generally consider desirable: diligence with re-
spect to details. Historical circumstances were such that this combination
turned him into one of the greatest criminals of his time. Eichmann gradually
became an obsessed fanatic, probably because the identification with his work
increased over time.119 This is typical for many people who search for recogni-
tion through their work. Eichmann was neither a sadist nor a psychopath in
110 See ibid., at 453.
111 Ibid.
112 A. Cassese, ‘Eichmann: Is Evil so Banal?’, 7 JICJ (2009) 645^652, at 645.
113 Goldstone mentioned the number in a conversation with Antonio Cassese. See Stuart and
Simons, supra note 80, at 53.
114 Arguing against any (psychological and social) reductionism: D. Kaminer and D.J. Stein,
‘Sadistic Personality Disorders in Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses: A South African
Case Study’, 15 Journal of Personality Disorders (2001) 475^486.
115 Todorov, supra note 109, at 447.
116 Cassese, supra note 112, at 645.
117 The ‘eternal’ question whether it is appropriate to address the deeds under heading of ‘banal-
ity’ is left aside here. See e.g. M. Ezra, ‘The Eichmann Polemics: Hannah Arendt and Her
Critics’, 9 Democratiya (2007) 141^165 (with references).
118 For a character revealing description of Eichmann’s journey up the career ladder, see B.
Stangneth, Eichmann vor Jerusalem (Rowohlt, 2014), at Chapter 1.
119 G. Bach, ‘The Trial of Adolf Eichmann’, 7 JICJ (2009) 647^652, at 649.
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the psychiatric sense. But how, then, is it possible that he did not experience
feelings of guilt and remorse afterwards?
The second step is to propose that the so-called theory of ‘neutralization’ of
community norms explains, at least partly, the lack of the emotions we regard
as expectable. Originally developed in the late 1950s to address ordinary juven-
ile criminality, the theory deals with the invalidation of general (social) com-
munity norms. It is of interest here as it links developments at the macro level
of a group with subjective emotional reactions of its members to wrongs.120
Juveniles often act in groups with their ‘own’ normative universe. Use of ‘neu-
tralization techniques’ within the group can lead to the erosion of general
social norms over time and foster criminality.121 Five ‘neutralization tech-
niques’ can be distinguished: denial of personal responsibility, denial of injury
of others, denial of victims, condemnation of condemners and requirement of
loyalty to higher ranked decision-makers. Jointly they help to create the
group’s value system and identity. Claims about who belongs to the in-group
and why, about the past, unjustly denied rights, heroic sacrifices and higher
destinies etc., appear as self-evident to the group members.122 An own group
universe arises, whose imaginative or even spiritual dimension is strengthened
by common sensual experiences, e.g. through wearing uniforms. The famous
Stanford Prison Experiment,123 a study of the psychological effects of becom-
ing a prisoner or prison guard conducted at Stanford University in 1971, has
shown, inter alia, how much costumes can reduce individuality and increase
the identity of the group and the importance of its norms.124 Groups grant
increased anonymity and reduce the sense of responsibility, people tend to
behave conform with their group norms ç regardless whether they are pro-
or antisocial.125 De-individuation in a group with a strong identity does not
mean an entire loss of the self, as simplifying theories claim, but a decreased
focus on personal identity and, foremost, high responsiveness to group norms
120 See G.M. Sykes and D. Mataza, ‘ ‘‘Techniques’’ of Neutralization: A Theory of Deliquency’, 22
American Sociological Review (1957) 664^670.
121 S. Harrendorf, ‘How Can Criminology Contribute to an Explanation of International Crimes?’
12 JICJ (2014) 231^252, at 249 (with references).
122 See e.g. A. Alvarez,‘Destructive Beliefs: Genocide and the Role of Ideology’, in A. Smeulers and
R. Haveman (eds), Supranational Criminology: Towards a Criminology of International Crimes
(Intersentia, 2008) 213^231, at 216.
123 The aim of the study was to investigate how people react when randomly assigned the roles of
guard or prisoner in a role-playing exercise simulating prison life. The participants adapted
to their roles in an unexpectedly extreme manner. The guards enforced authoritarian meas-
ures and subjected some of the prisoners to psychological torture. The study was supposed
to go on for two weeks. But the brutality of the guards and the suffering of the prisoners
were so intense that after only six days the experiment was terminated. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the experiment, see P.G. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People
Turn Evil (Random House, 2008).
124 C. Haney, C. Banks and P.G. Zimbardo, ‘Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison’, 1
International Journal of Criminology and Penology (1973) 69^97.
125 See Harrendorf, supra note 121, at 243.
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and group pressure.126 Macro crimes are typically committed by formal or in-
formal organizations that exercise pressure on their members and constantly
confirm (or strengthen) their own symbolic universe by way of using ‘neutral-
ization techniques’. Such recoding of the group’s morality transforms the nor-
mally criminal behaviour into conform conduct.127 Macro crimes typically do
not constitute deviant behaviour, ordinary crimes do. The ordinary criminal is
punished for the violation of a group norm, when he is not able to conceal
it,128 but the macro criminal acts in accordance with the group code and may
expect acceptance and in some instances even a reward. Constant use of ‘neu-
tralization techniques’ helps to reduce cognitive dissonances between the
group’s code and normal community norms.129 The perception of the criminal
act as something wrong erodes over time and so does the capacity to experi-
ence feelings of guilt and shame ç the emotional components of remorse.
The theory of ‘neutralization’ mainly offers an explanation for how people
who tend to behave conformly immunize themselves more and more against
the moral bindingness of social community norms.
At this point, it seems necessary to introduce a distinction between two
categories of high-ranking perpetrators: between highest and ‘only’ high-
ranking offenders. The distinction is necessary as the theory of ‘neutralization’
has a lot to say about the behaviour and emotions of high ranks, but less
about highest ranking perpetrators. This is the third step of my argument con-
cerning the lack of remorse among members of the macro criminal elite. The
top circle ç particularly those who were already there in the early phase of
the crime ç is actively involved in the neutralization of the social community
norms. Highest ranking perpetrators formulate and spread the ideology and
demand allegiance from the rest, the top circle strategically normalizes hatred
that initially may have been deviant and isolated. Their behaviour is, therefore,
more deviant than conform. One may call this category of perpetrators with
Mark A. Drumbl ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ to emphasize their role as ultimate de-
cision-makers.130 Lack of remorse at this level can hardly be explained by the
theory of ‘neutralization’. If I am right, this is the point where psychopathology
comes back into play.What I have written on the ‘normality’ of perpetrators of
macro crimes in general, hardly applies to this particular category of offenders.
Reviews of psychiatric classifications of conflict entrepreneurs seem to show a
high likelihood of a pathological psyche. Hitler, Milos› evic¤ , Karadzic¤ and
Mladic¤ , to mention a few of the best known, all showed signs of a pathological
126 See ibid., at 243 (with reference to concepts developed by ‘social identity theory’).
127 See H. Ja« ger, Makrokriminalita« t: Studien zur Kriminologie kollektiver Gewalt (Suhrkamp, 1989),
at 12; for an in-depth analysis of conformity and deviance in perpetrators of macro crime,
see Drumbl, supra note 9, 227^255.
128 D. Downes and P. Rock, Understanding Deviance (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 1998), at
26^27.
129 See Harrendorf, supra note 121, at 249.
130 Drumbl, supra note 9, at 25.
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psyche, the findings ranging from narcissistic over malignant narcissistic to
psychopathical personalities.131 The trait all these personality disorders have
in common is the missing or highly reduced ability to feel remorse.132
We, therefore, have two explanations for lacking remorse among members of
the elite in this roughly sketched model. There is the neutralization of commu-
nity norms that plays a key role with respect to conformist high ranks, and
there is the psychopathical personality that seems to be the main explanation
with respect to conflict entrepreneurs. Evidence from early release cases pro-
vides some modest support for this view. Early release proceedings are interest-
ing for our topic insofar as, at the time of the decision, perpetrators have
already spent several years in a prison environment, which is hostile to the
antisocial group norms according to which they had acted when they com-
mitted the crimes. With respect to conformist perpetrators, which are more
likely to be found among high rather than highest ranks, a certain adjustment
to the norms of the new environment and some instances of late remorse
would not come as a surprise. In early release cases at the ICTYand the MICT
(in cases concerning former Yugoslavia), eight applicants showed remorse for
the first time at their early release hearing.133 Some of them were high rank-
ing, as for example, Dragoljub Ojdanic¤ ,134 but none belonged to the top circle.
Of the highest ranking perpetrators at the ICTY to date only Biljana Plavs› ic¤
was yet eligible for early release; it has been discussed that her statement of re-
morse was coldly calculated.135 In early release cases at the ICTR and the
MICT (in cases concerning the conflict in Rwanda), only one applicant
showed remorse for the first time at his early release hearing. He ç Samuel
Imanishimwe ç was not a high-ranking offender, though. As regards the
ICC, one of the two cases of early release proceedings is interesting for our pur-
pose. It concerns Germain Katanga, a former leader of a Congolese rebel unit,
who was unrepentant at the time of his conviction. He was a high-ranking of-
fender but did not belong to the top circle. While serving his sentence, he
started to show signs of sincere remorse. The ICC accepted his statement of
131 See i.e. A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd edn., Routledge, 2011), at 385; R.
Pettman, ‘Psychopathology and World Affairs’, 23 Cambridge Review of International Affairs
(2010) 475^492, at 484; B. Glad, ‘Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and
Absolute Power’, 23 Political Psychology (2002) 1^37, at 3; K.B. Dekleva and J.M. Post,
‘Genocide in Bosnia: The Case of Dr. Radovan Karadzic¤ ’, 25 Journal of the American Academy
of Psychiatry and the Law (1997) 485^496, at 491^492.
132 Psychopathy: R.D. Hare, G.S. Neumann and T.A.Widiger,‘Psychopathy’, in T.A.Widiger (ed.),The
Oxford Handbook of Personality Disorders (Oxford University Press, 2012) 78^504, at 479; ma-
lignant narcissism: M. Goldner-Vukov and L.J. Moore: ‘Malignant Narcissism: from Fairy Tales
to Harsh Reality’, 22 Psychiatria Danubina (2010) 392^405, at 393; narcissism: O.F. Kernberg,
‘The almost Untreatable Narcissistic Patient’, 55 Journal of the American Psychoanalytical
Association (2007) 503^539, at 505.
133 The number of applicants who showed remorse for the first time at their early release hearing
was established by my research team.
134 Dragoljub Ojdanic¤ was the Chief of the General Staff of theYugoslavArmy.
135 See Section 3.A of this article.
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regret at his sentence review hearing.136 It may, on the whole, be too early,
though, to draw conclusions from these ICC cases.
The essence of this section can be summarized in two findings. First, to date,
not one single case of a truly repentant perpetrator belonging to the top circle
of conflict entrepreneurs exists. Plavs› ic¤ and Speer, the names mainly asso-
ciated with the topic, are in fact counter-examples. The typical attitude of high-
est ranks towards the indictment and punishment is defiance and anger.With
respect to high ranks, the picture is more diverse. There are rare cases of re-
penting offenders of this category, but the threshold to express remorse re-
mains high. The case of Milan Babic¤ shows the existential abysses in a truly
remorseful perpetrator of macro crimes. In sum, the seemingly scandalous re-
morselessness of political and military leaders at Nuremberg and before the
ICTY and the ICTR, and in particular of Milos› evic¤ , Mladic¤ and arguably
Karadz› ic¤ , to mention only the best known offenders, is less surprising than at
first sight. The likelihood of them displaying the symbolically so important
deep dismay because of what they were part of is depressingly low.
C. Overestimated Positive Effects
The last critical reflection concerns the assumed effects of sincere remorse and
wholehearted apology where they exist at all. Also in this respect, things are
much more complicated than in the context of ordinary crimes. It needs em-
phasis that remorse and apologies after atrocities always have many audiences:
victims, perpetrators, supporters of victims, supporters of the perpetrators,
the wider public etc.137 They all have diverse needs and play a role in the recon-
ciliation process. Their agendas often contradict each other. Some want the
perpetrators to admit what they have done, others are dissatisfied with the
degree of remorse or the moment of the apology. Some find that the perpetra-
tors have the wrong kind of sorrow, which may be founded mainly in fear of
the personal consequences, and others prefer the perpetrators to remain silent.
Even sincere remorse is perceived by some as an unbearable provocation.
They find that publicly remorseful perpetrators get undue influence over the
truth-telling process and unnecessary attention for their questionable morality.
According to the South African writer Sandile Dikeni, the problem with
public expressions of remorse after grave crimes is that it pushes the moral
high ground back to the perpetrators.138 The moral expectation to act, to con-
tribute to reconciliation, may silently shift to the victims who feel pressured.139
136 See Sentence Review Hearing, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-347), Appeals Chamber, 6 October
2015, at 33^34; Decision on the Review Concerning Reduction of Sentence, Katanga (ICC-01/
04-01/07-3615), Appeals Chamber, 13 November 2015, x50.
137 L. Payne, ‘In Search for Remorse: Confessions by Perpetrators of Past State Violence’, 11 The
Brown Journal ofWorld Affairs (2004) 115^126, at 121.
138 See M. Gevisser,‘Sandile Dikeni, Poet and Radio Broadcaster: AVoice of Truth and Dissent’,The
Weekly Mail and Guardian, 26 July 1996.
139 J.A. Corlett, ‘Forgiveness, Apology, and Retributive Punishment’, 43 American Philosophical
Quarterly (2006) 25^42, at 30.
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They may suffer from the hopes placed on them to accept the apology.140 Even
if it is ‘objectively’ clear that a victim of a grave crime is by no means morally
obligated to forgive the offender,141 the social reality of the victim may be en-
tirely different. Forgiving after such crimes, though, is neither ‘just normal’
nor expectable. It is a most difficult step. It requires the victims to make a dis-
tinction between the immoral act and the immoral actor. They must forgive
the one without tacitly approving of the other so that forgiveness can be
squared with self-respect.142 Not everybody is able to make the distinction.
The negative feelings might be too strong. Some may even desperately wish to
be able to forgive, but they cannot. Many victims react furiously to attempts
to make them feel guilty for not being prepared or able to forgive. Given these
diverse attitudes towards public remorse after macro crimes, the path from re-
morse to reconciliation appears as infinitely longer than in the context of or-
dinary crimes, not only because of the gravity. The view quoted at the
beginning of this article that a complete and sincere apology by itself is capable
of effecting reconciliation, seems detached from reality.
4. Final Remark
I am still troubled with the topic of this article. Somehow, I continue to find it
difficult to believe that remorse and appropriate apologies play such a poor
role in trials on grave crimes. At the same time and against the background of
what I wrote, it seems entirely logical to me. Also, I still find that remorse and
apology after such crimes are a valid test of ‘humanity’ in a way. At the same
time, and paradoxically, too, I see some truth in the argument that some of-
fences are so evil that they go beyond the purview of remorse and apology.143
I presume that many readers share my ambivalences. Intellectually and emo-
tionally, the topic resists clear framing.
One thing I am sure about, though, is that we ç at least inWestern societies
where I come from ç intuitively put too much hope into remorse and apology
in the context of macro crimes. We are influenced by the experiences in the
micro sphere of our own lives and the role of remorse and apology in domestic
criminal proceedings of our societies. We have heard countless media stories
about remorseful offenders and magic reconciliations, and we have the strong
wish that remorse and apology also play significant roles in international
140 J.L. Risen and T. Gilovich, ‘Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable
Apologies’, 15 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2007) 418^433, at 419; M.K.
Dhami, ‘Effects of a Victim’s Response to an Offender’s Apology:When the Victim Becomes the
Bad Guy’, 46 European Journal of Social Psychology (2016) 110^123, at 111.
141 For a convincing philosophical argumentation, see Corlett, supra note 139, at 28^31.
142 H. Strang, ‘Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice’, 15 Utah Law Review (2003)
15^42, at 23.
143 Speer himself recognized this problem in his memoirs. He wrote that no apologies are pos-
sible. See A. Speer, Inside theThird Reich (Phoenix, 2003), at 171. The problem has been labelled
the ‘paradox of remorse’: see Murphy, supra note 22, at 426^427.
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criminal proceedings. International criminal tribunals, it appears to me, act as
if they were guided by the same thoughts and emotions. This may explain
why they do not reflect on the particularities of remorse and apology in the
context of macro crimes appropriately and import practices and beliefs from
the domestic sphere, hardly giving a thought to the price for this transfer.
They see remorse where there is none which may provide a short-term sense
of security and console a little. It remains a perception, which is counterfac-
tual, though. So why ç I ask again ç is so much hope put into remorse and
apology?
It seems to me that a deep wish to avoid the void must play a key role. The in-
sight that humans, who share our anthropology, are capable of committing
grave crimes without experiencing remorse or having the slightest wish to
apologize to the victims, is frightening. The topic probably touches upon a spir-
itual dimension of our existence. It challenges the way we perceive humans
and how we make sense of the notion of humankind. Are we unconsciously
led by the hope that nobody is definitely lost? Religious concepts may play a
certain role in the background. All Abrahamic religions, for example, create a
dichotomy around remorse and conceptualize it in the idea of the Last
Judgment.144 The believer and the repentant can expect redemption, while
the unrepentant is sent to hell. International criminal tribunals can be re-
garded as courts of last resort of the secular world. If these final intuitions
about the topic were true, we could at least say that the utopian hope in the
power of remorse and apology also reflects one of the most noble characteris-
tics of most humans: the capacity to empathize with others where reason
would tell us not to.
144 See D. Leeming, The Oxford Companion toWorld Mythology (Oxford University Press, 2005), at
237; concerning Christianity: R. Leuze, Das Christentum: Grundriss einer monotheistischen
Religion (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), at 187^188; concerning Islam: Hadhrat Mirza
Masroor Ahmad, Der Islam und die Freiheit des Gewissens (Verlag der Islam, 2013), at 75^77;
concerning Judaism: M. Tilly, Das Judentum (Marix, 2007), at 178.
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